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Ⅰ　DevelopmentofJapanese
MultinationalEnterprises
1　Big Changes in International Strategy
　Japanese companies have made big changes in 
their international strategies for the last nearly sixty 
years. Until 1985 export was the most important 
strategy. The Plaza Accord was concluded in 
September 1985 and it triggered a sharp rise of 
Japanese yen. In August 1985, 1 US＄was around 
240 yen, and one year later 1 US＄became about 
150 yen, thus jumping up by almost 40％ in one 
year. Facing the sharp appreciation of yen, Japanese 
multinational enterprises made strategic decisions 
to shift the emphasis on international strategies 
from export to overseas production. In this sense 
the year 1985 was a turning point for Japanese 
multinationals. More recently, overseas R&D has 
been actively conducted by many Japanese com-
panies.
　There are two important aspects in the strategic 
changes of Japanese multinationals.  First, the 
strategic changes took place chronologically. They 
have been conducted step by step in time sequence 
from export to overseas production and lastly to 
overseas R&D. Second, the strategic changes are 
accumulative. After mid 1980s Japanese multi-
nationals shifted their strategies from export to 
overseas production. It does not mean that they 
stopped export. Today, the most common practice 
is that three kinds of strategies of export, overseas 
production and overseas R&D, are pursued 
simultaneously.
　Through the historical development of inter-
national business strategy of Japanese companies, 
a lot of Japanese multinational enterprises 
were born. Here the multinational enterprises 
are those companies that meet two criteria. 
First, they are among the largest 500 companies 
listed at the first section of Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Market. Second, they have manufacturing subsid-
iaries in at least five foreign countries.1
　The numbers of the Japanese multinationals have 
been;（Yoshihara, 2006）
37 as of 1974
67 as of 1982
149 as of 1994
208 as of 2002
　Thus, today, multinational enterprises are 
common among large Japanese companies.
　One of my friends, an alumnus from Kobe 
University, was a board member in charge of 
overseas operations at an automobile parts man-
ufacturer. He was assigned to USA in early 1970s. 
At that time he never thought of working abroad. 
These days young employees of the company take 
it granted that they some time will work at overseas 
subsidiaries.
　Today, the total of three hundred thirty thousand 
Japanese businessmen and their families are living 
in foreign countries（as of 2002︶. Additionally, more 
than fifteen million Japanese people go abroad for 
sightseeing every year.
2　Small Changes in International Management
　When we turn attention from the strategy to the 
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management of Japanese multinationals, we see 
that changes have been smaller.
　The ownership policy has changed. Until mid 
1970s, the ownership pattern of Japanese 
multinationals had distinct features. Joint ventures 
were dominant and in many cases Sogo-shosha 
︵general trading companies）became partners. 
However, after 1990s, 100％ ownership has become 
more dominant, and Sogo-shosha almost dis-
appeared as partners.（Yoshihara, 2001a）
　The organization has also changed. In 1970s the 
most common organization was ʻoverseasʼ division. 
However, later on, the ʻ globalʼ division instead of the 
ʻoverseasʼ division gradually increased and recently 
has become the dominant type. Roughly speaking, 
there seems to be thirty years of time lag between 
Japanese and US multinationals regarding the 
development of organizational form.（Fujino, 
1998）
　With regard to people and language in 
international management, we see little change 
over long period of time. The Japanese multination-
als are engaged in business globally and they 
manage their global operations by Japanese people 
and in the Japanese language.（Yoshihara, 2001b）
　Another feature of the management of Japanese 
multinationals, non- internationalization of Japanese 
head offices, is closely related with the above 
mentioned two features of Japanese style 
international management, that is, management by 
Japanese people and management in the Japanese 
language. At Japanese parent companies only 
Japanese people work in their accustomed Japanese 
ways using the Japanese language.
　Thus, we may summarize existing Japanese style 
of international management as the triangle system 
consists of the three elements of（1︶ management 
by Japanese people,（2︶ management in the 
Japanese language, and（3︶ non-internationalization 
at Japanese head offices.
　The Japanese style of international management 
has some problems. One of them is that Japanese 
companies are not attractive to the mangers of local 
nationals. 
　In 1985, Professor Christopher A. Bartlett of 
Harvard Business School conducted field research 
on Japanese multinationals in Japan. I was a co-
researcher and an interpreter. One day I asked him. 
“Suppose you are a Harvard Business School 
graduate. Do you want to work at Japanese 
companies like Toyota, Matsushita and Canon in 
the United States?” He answered “No”. I asked 
“Why?” He pointed out the following features of 
Japanese style of international management. 
︵Bartlett and Yoshihara, 1988）
　︵1︶　low initial salary and post
　︵2︶　slow pace of salary increase and promotion
　︵3︶　limited promotion opportunities
　︵4︶　little room for participation in decision 
process
　His comment which was made in mid 1980s is 
still relevant today. And it is relevant to Japanese 
companies not only in USA but also in other 
countries like European countries and Asian 
countries such as UK, France, Germany, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and China.
　The above mentioned problems of Japanese style 
international management may be more accurately 
described with the phrase, “The Bright and the 
Dark Sides of Japanese Management Overseas.” 
︵Yoshihara, 1989）Japanese production manage-
ment like Toyota Production System functions well 
in foreign countries. Overseas plants are attractive 
to workers of local nationals. On the other hand, 
offices of Japanese companies are not attractive to 
managers and white collar people.
　In this paper, I would like to focus my attention on 
the triangle system of international management of 
Japanese multinationals. For the last two years, I 
conducted interviews to around fifteen major 
Japanese multinationals such as Toyota, Matsushita, 
Sony, NEC, Canon, Omron, Komatsu, Daikin, 
Denso, Aishin Seiki, Asahi Glass, Takeda, Kao and 
Ajinomoto. And I have found that Japanese 
multinationals have at last started to change their 
triangle system of international management.
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Ⅱ　ChangesinInternationalManagement
1　 CEOs of Local Nationals at Overseas 
Subsidiaries
　I conducted field research on Japanese compa-
nies in Bangkok, Thailand in 1974. One of the 
findings was that localization of management at 
Japanese companies was behind US and European 
multinationals. All CEOs at Japanese companies in 
Thailand were Japanese expatriates.（Yoshihara, 
1975）
　According to the data of my mail questionnaire 
survey, which was conducted on global base, as of 
1994, 484（78％）subsidiaries had Japanese CEOs 
and 136（22％）subsidiaries had non-Japanese 
CEOs.（Yoshihara, 1996）
　Let me tell you about my interesting discussion 
with the managers of Japanese multinationals. It 
was in mid 1980s. I asked them. “Which do you 
think is better for US and European multinationals; 
to have Japanese CEOs at their Japanese subsidiar-
ies or make expatriates from their own countries 
become CEOs in Japan?” They answered. “Japanese 
CEOs are better.” I asked why. They pointed out the 
following reasons. Japanese CEOs are more familiar 
with local business situations. They are better at 
building good relationships with local business 
community, government officials and customers. 
Employees are Japanese and communication with 
them is done in the Japanese language. Then, I 
asked them. “Who are CEOs at your overseas 
subsidiaries, Japanese or local nationals?” They 
answered. “Our CEOs are Japanese.” Then I 
summarized their opinions in the following way. 
The US and European multinationals in Japan 
should have Japanese CEOs, and the Japanese 
multinationals in foreign countries should have 
Japanese CEOs also. I asked the managers. “Do you 
mean that CEOs should be Japanese people all over 
the world?” They responded “Yes” with smile in 
their faces. The discussion struck me. I thought 
that something must be wrong.（Yoshihara, 2001a）
　In September 2001 I was asked to become an 
instructor at Toyota Executive Development 
Program. In my lecture, I pointed out that the 
majority of CEOs at overseas subsidiaries were 
Japanese. And, I added that this was true with 
Toyota as other large Japanese companies. Then, I 
was criticized by a senior manager who was in 
charge of overseas operations. The CEO of Toyota 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. in USA was not 
Japanese but an American. It was the largest 
overseas manufacturing subsidiaries of Toyota. As 
a matter of fact, Toyota promoted an American 
manager to the CEO position at the company a few 
months earlier than my lecture. 
　These days more and more Japanese 
multinationals have localized CEOs at overseas 
subsidiaries. Roughly speaking, about one third of 
the CEOs at overseas subsidiaries are local 
nationals. Localization of CEOs is more advanced at 
sales subsidiaries than at manufacturing sub-
sidiaries. An electronics company has promoted 
managers of local nationals to the CEO position at 
seven overseas sales subsidiaries in EU. When 
Japanese multinationals acquired existing local 
companies, they often have CEOs of local nationals 
at the acquired subsidiaries.
　CEOs of local nationals are required to have the 
following traits. 
　First, managers with local nationalities are 
required to work for a long period before they are 
promoted to CEOs. For example, at Toyota it took 
more than ten years before local managers were 
promoted to CEOs at major manufacturing 
subsidiaries in USA, Canada and UK. Internal 
promotion is common and hiring managers as 
CEOs from outside companies is rarely practiced. 
　The second trait is loyalty to organization. Let 
suppose that two persons are candidates for CEO 
position. The first person has high record in 
performance and moderate record in loyalty to 
organization. The second person has moderate 
score in performance and high score in 
organizational loyalty. Japanese multinationals 
generally promote the second person. Japanese 
companies highly evaluate a man of loyalty.
　A senior executive vice president of a large 
electronics company told me. The CEOs represent 
the companies. They work twenty four hours a day, 
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and three hundred sixty five days a year. They are 
required to sacrifice their private lives for the good 
of the companies.
　The third trait is the acceptance of corporate 
philosophy. 
　Many multinationals have education and training 
centers. One of their missions is to develop 
managers who are qualified for global operations of 
the companies. These centers emphasize education 
of corporate philosophy. Based on the corporate 
philosophy codes of behavior are developed which 
tell employees how to behave. 
　As overseas operations increase it becomes 
important for a company to have an explicit code of 
behavior for employees all over the world. To be 
promoted to CEOs, understanding and practicing 
the code of behavior is a must. Managerial 
capabilities and performance are not enough. They 
are required that they practice the code of behavior 
which is based on the corporate philosophy.
　Thus, at Japanese multinationals, conformity 
rather than diversity is pursued. Managers of local 
nationals at overseas subsidiaries are required to 
learn and practice corporate philosophy, man-
agement style, management know-how, and good 
practices of Japanese parent companies. 
　Japanese language ability is not included in the 
list of required traits. As a matter of fact, except for 
rare cases existing CEOs of local nationals are not 
proficient in Japanese.
　Localization of CEOs at overseas subsidiaries is 
now being pursued for practical reasons. Probably 
the most urgent reason is that Japanese people are 
not enough to manage fast growing overseas 
operations. In addition, promotion of managers of 
local nationals to the CEO positions has symbolic 
meaning. Local managers generally think or believe 
that there exists a limit of promotion to CEO position 
at foreign subsidiaries.  Japanese people deny the 
promotion limit. Managers of local nationals have 
difficulty in believing it. Assigning a local manager 
to be a CEO could make a good example which 
convinces local managers of non-existence of glass 
ceiling（or rice-paper ceiling）of promotion.（Kopp, 
1994）One real case tells more than many words.
　At regional management meeting in Europe of an 
electronics company, announcement of promotion 
of a manager of local nationals to CEO position is 
welcomed by enthusiastic applause from his 
subordinates within the subsidiary and colleagues 
at other subsidiaries. It nurtures and spreads a 
feeling among employees all over the world that the 
company is not a Japanese company but an 
international one.
　Some companies put emphasis more on the 
symbolic meaning than on the practical effect of 
localization of CEOs at overseas subsidiaries. From 
practical managerial reasons it seems too early to 
realize CEOs of local nationals. But considering the 
motivational effect, companies attempt localization 
of CEOs at overseas subsidiaries.
2　English
　A Japanese CEO at an Australian subsidiary of a 
motor vehicle company declared a language policy 
called no-Japanese-use policy in mid 1970s. And he 
asked the head office in Japan to use English when 
they send fax（in those days e-mail was not used）to 
the Australian subsidiary. This kind of language 
policy was sometimes announced at Japanese 
multinationals, at parent head offices and/or over-
seas subsidiaries. However, there is no Japanese 
company that is successful in no-Japanese-use 
policy.
　Japanese multinationals still manage their global 
operations in the Japanese language. Let me 
elaborate the language problem of Japanese 
multinationals. The Japanese language plays 
important roles on the following three occasions. 
︵Yoshihara, 2001a）
　First, Japanese head offices often send informa-
tion to their overseas subsidiaries in the Japanese 
language. They send summary or conclusion of 
important decisions in English.
　Second, international communication between 
Japanese parent companies and their overseas 
subsidiaries on important matters is done in the 
Japanese language. Reporting and exchanging 
information about routine operations are mostly 
done in English.
　Third, at overseas subsidiaries, meetings where 
only Japanese attend are sometimes held. Japanese 
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people exchange information, discuss and make 
decisions in the Japanese language.
　Since most of the managers of local nationals at 
foreign subsidiaries do not have the Japanese 
language ability, they are not able to participate in 
information and decision processes at Japanese 
multinationals.
　At Japanese multinationals common basic 
language is not English but Japanese despite the 
fact that they have been trying for a long time to 
use English in their management. Why? One reason 
is the demerits for Japanese businessmen to use 
English in international business. When Japanese 
people use English in their international business, 
they usually have the following three kinds of 
difficulties.
　The first problem is psychological stress. 
Communication in English requires Japanese 
businessmen to keep continuous attention. When 
they relax, they often miss some messages in 
communication. 
　The second problem is the reduction of the 
volume of information. It takes more time for Japa-
nese people to read and write in English than in 
Japanese. When they are required to send some 
documents in English, they tend to send only 
important information. Or, they only send the 
conclusion or the summary of documents omitting 
details. 
　The third problem is the deterioration of the 
quality of information. I heard an interesting opin-
ion from a manager who was in charge of 
international business for many years. “When I use 
English in my discussion with foreigners, my IQ 
︵intelligence quotient）suddenly drops. Itʼs hard for 
me to convince them of my opinion in English. It is 
almost impossible to argue against them. I have had 
many vexing experiences. “ I told him. “I quite agree 
with you. I have had similar experiences in my 
academic life.”
　It may not be accurate if I do not mention good 
points about Japanese businessmenʼs using English 
in their business communication.（Yoshihara, Okabe 
and Sawaki, 2001）
　If their English is rather good, their communica-
tion becomes clearer, more logical, more explicit, 
shorter and thus easier to understand than using 
the Japanese language. Japanese people tend to 
become open, talkative and bold in their discussion. 
They sometimes openly display disagreement. 
They concentrate on important points omitting 
minor related points mainly because of their limited 
English language abilities. When they use English, 
they can change their mentality which is typical 
Japanese, moderate and passive to be more open 
and aggressive like American people.
　Traditional Japanese style of communication is 
characterized by such features as being inexplicit, 
being roundabout, demanding guesses about the 
meaning, and communication without language. 
These days, to speak and write directly（commu-
nication style of getting to the heart of the matter）is 
permitted or even welcomed at Japanese 
companies. This tendency is observed among 
young people. This style of communication is proper 
in international business because not only Japanese 
but also foreigners can participate in commu- 
nication.
　At some companies Japanese are able to have 
service of interpreter when it is necessary. Use of 
interpreter has good points for Japanese. Japanese 
understand what the interpreter tells in English. 
When the interpretation is wrong or inappropriate, 
they are able to correct or amplify it. While the 
interpreter tells in English, they have time to think. 
　China has become a very important foreign 
country to Japanese multinationals, and China 
deserves special attention from the standpoint of 
language. The subsidiaries of Japanese companies 
in China are managed in the Japanese language. An 
important reason is that Chinese people are good at 
learning Japanese. On the other hand, the Chinese 
language is a difficult language for Japanese people 
and only a limited number of Japanese expatriates 
in China are able to communicate in Chinese. 
　The use of the Japanese language at Chinese 
subsidiaries has good and bad points. The use of 
the Japanese language is convenient for Japanese 
managers both at Chinese subsidiaries and at 
Japanese head offices. Conversely, international 
communication of Chinese subsidiaries with other 
overseas subsidiaries in USA, European countries 
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and other countries is done in English. Thus, 
Chinese subsidiaries have problems in their global 
linkage with other overseas subsidiaries. It is also a 
problem in recruiting capable Chinese people. 
There are many English speaking Chinese people, 
but Japanese speaking Chinese people are scarce.
　Foreign managers at overseas subsidiaries are 
expected to learn minimum level of Japanese 
language. Just to say some greeting words in 
Japanese to Japanese people is effective in building 
good human relationship. Foreigners are not 
expected to have the Japanese language proficiency 
which is high enough to do business in the Japanese 
language.
3　 Internationalization at Japanese Head 
Offices
3-1　CEOs and Managers with Overseas Ex-
periences
　Human resources with overseas experiences 
were accumulated within Japanese parent com-
panies as a result of the long history and high 
growth rate of overseas operations. 
　The CEOs of many multinationals such as Canon, 
Matsushita, NEC, Takeda, Komatsu, and Omron 
have overseas experiences. The former two CEOs 
of Toyota have overseas experiences. 
　At the middle management levels many manag-
ers with overseas experiences work at various 
functional fields such as marketing, production, and 
R&D. Many managers working at the corporate 
staff sections of personnel, accounting, planning 
and general affairs also have overseas experiences.
　At a construction machinery company most of 
the plant managers of nine domestic plants have 
overseas experiences. And at the same company 
many of managers and specialists in charge of 
maintenance services have been abroad to repair 
machines installed overseas.
　At an electronics company one thousand 
employees are working at overseas subsidiaries. 
Five thousand employees have overseas 
experiences. They represent 25％ of the total 
employees of the Japanese parent company. At the 
copy machine division of the company, employees 
having overseas experiences amount to 70％ of the 
employees working at the head office in Tokyo. As 
female employees rarely go abroad, it means that 
almost all male employees have overseas 
experiences. It is not uncommon that the same 
people are assigned for work at overseas subsidiar-
ies three times or more.
　Until mid 1980s, assignments for overseas 
countries were often negatively received by 
employees for the following reasons. 
　First, overseas operations were considered as 
less important compared with main domestic 
operations. The capable people on the first track 
were retained in Japan and less capable people were 
expatriated（in the literal sense of the word）to 
overseas subsidiaries.
　Second, it was not rare that no appropriate jobs 
were given after returning to Japanese parent 
companies. Overseas experiences including foreign 
language proficiency were not useful in domestic 
operations at Japanese parent companies. In those 
days, Japanese market was not internationalized 
and domestic operations were literally domestic.
　Third, expatriates working abroad tend to be 
excluded from human network of Japanese parent 
companies. Engineers were afraid of obsolescence 
of their technology, expertise and knowledge.
　As a growing sector of companies has changed 
from domestic operations to overseas operations, 
assignments for overseas subsidiaries gradually 
gained attractiveness. These days many young 
employees are eager to work at overseas 
subsidiaries. It is a good career path. When they 
stay in Japan, they have little chance to be promoted 
to managerial positions. There are many companies 
where overseas experiences are requisites for 
promotion to the middle management positions. At 
these companies many young people apply for 
overseas assignments.
　It is now widely understood that foreign 
assignment is a good way of developing managerial 
persons who are candidates of top management at 
Japanese parent companies.
　To appoint managers with overseas experiences 
to CEO posts may be the most powerful stimulating 
factor which motivates employees, especially young 
ones to prepare for overseas assignments like 
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mastering English conversation. More and more 
employees listen to CNN news programs which are 
recorded on cassette tapes in commuting trains, 
buses and cars.
　A kind of good circle（opposite of vicious circle）is 
observed. Capable people are assigned for overseas 
subsidiaries. They achieve good performance 
records. After returning to Japanese head offices, 
they are promoted to higher positions. They become 
good role models to be followed by many. 
3-2　ForeignersatJapaneseHeadOffices
　At Asahi Glass Company two foreigners were 
appointed as board members of the Japanese parent 
company in 1999. They used to be the CEOs of 
overseas subsidiaries. One of them had stayed in 
Japan. Both of them did not speak Japanese.
　Foreign board members at Japanese parent 
companies are increasing these days. However, it is 
rare that they stay in Japan. Usually they work at 
overseas subsidiaries and attend the board meetings 
in Japan every month or every other month.
　At board meetings where Japanese and foreigners 
attend, both Japanese and English are used. At one 
company official language is Japanese and foreign-
ers have interpretation service. Handouts are 
written in Japanese and English. Power point slides 
are usually prepared in English. Japanese board 
members are better in reading English than 
listening and speaking English. Japanese board 
members are able to speak in the Japanese lan-
guage. Foreigners are provided with interpretation 
service. Foreign board members rarely are able to 
communicate in Japanese. 
　At Sumitomo Chemical Corporation an American 
person was appointed to the head of the export 
department of agricultural products in 1999. He was 
not a manager at an overseas subsidiary of the 
company and was scouted from an American 
company to occupy the post. He stayed at Japanese 
head office in Tokyo for nearly one and a half year. 
He did not speak Japanese. English naturally 
became common language within the department. 
Managerial practices related to his department 
such as budgeting, reporting, discussion and 
decision processes were substantially changed. A 
kind of cultural revolution occurred in the 
department and related other departments in the 
company.（Yoshihara, 2001a）
　His successor is a Japanese person. The company 
wanted to have a foreigner as his successor. But the 
companyʼs plan was not realized. One reason was a 
salary problem. The salary which is normal for the 
post in USA is unacceptably high for Japanese 
companies. The salary of the head of export 
department would exceed the salary of the top 
management of Japanese parent company. 
　When foreign board members and managers join 
the head offices of Japanese parent companies, they 
contribute in such ways as activating discussion at 
meetings and internationalizing management 
processes. Their weak points are that they lack 
hands-on knowledge of the operations at plants and 
sales organizations. When they are asked by 
Japanese people, “What are at the plants?” their 
typical answer is, “I do not know. The plant managers 
are responsible for operations and management at 
the plants.”
　Many of foreign employees working at Japanese 
parent companies are interpreters, translators, or 
instructors at education centers. There are also 
various specialists in charge of public relations for 
foreigners, advertisement, and investment 
relationship. Many of them are hired in Japan and 
are non-regular employees. Many foreign scientists 
and engineers are working at R&D organizations of 
Japanese parent companies. 
　Announcements of the promotion of the manag-
ers of local nationals to the board members of 
Japanese parent companies motivate managers of 
local nationals at overseas subsidiaries. These 
cases show not by words but by concrete examples 
that non-Japanese can expect to be promoted to the 
top management positions at Japanese head offices. 
At a company such an announcement was made at a 
regional management meeting in Europe and a 
foreign CEO at an overseas subsidiary was 
promoted to the officer of the Japanese parent 
company. The announcement was greeted by loud 
cheers of all managers attending the meeting. They 
said that “our company is not just for Japanese 
employees but also for non-Japanese.”
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　Many of the Japanese managers who occupy the 
senior management positions at Japanese parent 
companies or foreign subsidiaries have global 
career experiences. Their careers are usually not 
restricted in Japan, but are extended in several 
foreign countries. On the other hand, the careers of 
the managers of local nationals at overseas 
subsidiaries are mostly restricted in their present 
subsidiaries. They are promoted within the present 
subsidiaries. They rarely have had chances to work 
in other foreign subsidiaries or at Japanese head 
offices. 
　An automobile company, in order to remedy the 
narrow careers of the managers of the local nation-
als at overseas subsidiaries, has started regional or 
lateral transfer of managerial persons. A manager at 
a subsidiary in USA is transferred to management 
position at a Canadian subsidiary. Or, a manager at 
UK subsidiary is promoted to a higher position at a 
Spanish subsidiary. The companyʼs next plan is to 
promote lateral transfer on global scale like transfer 
of managers in USA to UK subsidiary. The reverse 
transfer of local managers from overseas subsidiar-
ies to Japanese head offices is also included in the 
next plan.
　With respect to the careers of the managers of 
local nationals, China provides an interesting case. 
Overseas Chinese managers working at subsidiaries 
in Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and 
Singapore go to Chinese subsidiaries on a temporal 
basis to assist production start ups or to help solving 
product quality problems. They are Chinese people 
and thus know local conditions including Chinese 
culture and habits. And, they are able to 
communicate in Chinese.
4　Cautious Pragmatism
　Japanese multinationals have clear goals with 
respect to changes in international management. 
The existing Japanese style of international 
management has three features. They are : 
① Japanese CEOs at overseas subsidiaries, ② the 
Japanese language, ③ non-internationalization at 
Japanese head offices. Contrastingly, emerging new 
style of international management is characterized 
by : ① CEOs of local nationals at overseas 
subsidiaries, ② English, ③ internationalization at 
Japanese head offices. Thus, the goal of Japanese 
companies for changing their international 
management is rather ambitious. On the other 
hand, the way of attaining it is cautious and 
pragmatic.
　First, Japanese multinationals are not hasty in 
attaining the goal. A manager of an automobile 
components manufacturer told me. “We can not 
attain the goal in a few years. The plan will take ten 
years.” 
　Second, they take step by step solution and 
piecemeal approach. Big ban theory is not applied. 
　Third, they are realistic and they do not hesitate 
to compromise. To be promoted to managerial 
positions, employees are required to achieve 
targeted scores of TOEIC（Test of English for 
International Communication︶. There are some plants 
where nobody has been promoted to managers for 
several years because of English requirements. 
English is not used in daily work at these plants. To 
remedy the promotion problems, the following 
means are adopted. Employees who are older than 
certain ages are exempted from TOEIC require-
ments. English test applies only to the first track 
employees, and other non-first track employees are 
not subjected to English test. English is not re-
quired for those who are candidates for operations 
in China. Instead of English test, Chinese language 
ability is required to them.
　As for the way of using English, at a company, 
ʻglobalʼ English is recommended instead of native 
English. One feature of ʻglobalʼ English is that there 
is a speed limit. Native English speakers like 
Americans and the British are required to speak 
slowly. Another feature is length of sentence. 
Sentences must be short with simple words.2
　There are exceptions. A few Japanese multi-
nationals have pursued radical innovation in their 
international management. 
　Sony is one of the few exceptions. Mr. Harvey 
Shine was the CEO at Sony America from 1972 to 
1978. He used to be the president of CBS 
International and scouted by Sony to be the CEO of 
its US subsidiary. Mr. Shine is probably the first 
case of the CEO of local nationals at overseas sub-
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sidiaries of Japanese multinationals. The present 
CEO is Sir Howard Stringer. He works in New York 
for three weeks and in Tokyo for one week every 
month. He does not speak Japanese.
　Asahi Glass is another example of the exceptions. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the company promoted 
two foreign managers who used to be the CEOs at 
their overseas subsidiaries to the board members 
of the parent company. It represented radical 
change in the international management of the 
company. The foreign board members were 
responsible for two branches of businesses. One of 
them worked at Tokyo head office. He did not speak 
Japanese. English naturally became official lan-
guage at his organization.
Ⅲ　ImplicationsofManagementChange
1　Global vs. Metanational
　In terms of sales, production and employees, 
overseas operations already exceed domestic 
operations at many Japanese multinationals. And it 
is anticipated that overseas operations will grow 
faster than domestic operations in the future. At a 
company overseas sales occupy 80％ of the total 
sales and domestic sales represent only 20％. 
Production is evenly divided between domestic 
production and overseas production. There are nine 
plants in Japan and twenty seven in foreign coun-
tries. And it is anticipated that the future growth 
will largely take place overseas.
　The management of fast growing overseas 
operations requires ample supply of Japanese 
people from parent companies. However, parent 
companies are not able to respond to the require-
ment simply because of the shortage of qualified 
people. At a company Japanese expatriates have 
been stable around two hundred and seventy for 
the last fifteen years. The size of overseas production 
has more than doubled. Thus, per head overseas 
operations has increased to the point where 
Japanese expatriates have to bear excessive 
burden.
　Many Japanese multinationals are facing serious 
problems of how to respond to fast growing over-
seas operations. Overseas operations are growing 
so fast and becoming so large in scale that Japanese 
people alone are not enough to manage them. 
Managers of local nationals are expected to join 
management teams of Japanese companies and 
work together with Japanese people. To realize this, 
the Japanese style of international management 
needs to be changed so that it becomes more 
attractive to the managers of local nationals.
　In addition to people, various resources such 
as technology, know-how, skills, management 
processes and the brands of Japanese parent 
companies are transferred to overseas subsidiaries. 
Overseas subsidiaries are dependent on the 
resources of Japanese parent companies. And the 
central role of overseas subsidiaries is to implement 
the strategies of Japanese parent companies. 
Overseas subsidiaries rarely develop new products, 
new production equipment and new management 
skills. And therefore, it is rare that overseas 
subsidiaries reversely transfer their resources to 
Japanese parent companies. Thus, Japanese 
multinationals are ʻglobalʼ in the sense of the word 
used by Bartlett and Ghoshal.（Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989）
　Japanese multinationals are only partially 
metanational.（Doz, 2006 ; Asakawa, 2006）In the 
case of a pharmaceutical company US operations 
are more important than domestic ones. The US 
market is larger in size and faster growing than 
Japanese market. R&D capabilities are more 
advanced in USA than in Japan, thus more new 
drugs are developed in USA. Adapting to the 
features of pharmaceutical industry, Japanese 
multinationals like Takeda have changed the role of 
US subsidiaries from implementers to innovation 
centers. US subsidiaries are expected to develop 
new products for the world market, that is, US, 
Japanese and European market.
　At a machinery company, mother plants which 
have product development capabilities are located 
not only in Japan but also in foreign countries such 
as USA, UK, Germany, Sweden, and Italy. They plan 
to make Indian and Chinese subsidiaries mother 
plants in the near future. The location is decided 
based on the relative excellence of the countries for 
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the types of products. Overseas mother plants are 
centers of excellence for certain types of products 
and develop new products for world markets 
including Japanese market. Overseas mother plants 
are managed by the CEOs of local nationals.
　Regarding the theories of multinational enter-
prises, traditional theories developed by such 
pioneers as Stephen Hymer（1976）and Raymond 
Vernon（1972）are relevant to Japanese multi-
nationals. New theories developed by such 
theorists as C. A. Bartlett and S. Ghoshal（1989︶, 
J. Birkinshaw（1997︶, J. Birkinshaw and N. Hood 
︵1998）and Yves Doz（2006）are only partially 
relevant to Japanese multinationals. Thus, on the 
whole, changes in the international management of 
Japanese multinationals are taking place in the 
framework of traditional multinational enterprise 
model.
2　Weakening Japanese Uniqueness
　Until mid 1980s Japanese multinationals were 
different from US and European multinationals with 
respect to both strategy and management.
　As for export, Japanese multinationals exported 
through general trading companies more often than 
by their own export organizations. Overseas pro-
duction concentrated in less developed countries 
like Southeast Asian countries. Production in North 
America and Europe was rather rare. R&D was 
exclusively conducted in Japan.
　The international management of Japanese 
multinationals was also different. Joint ventures 
were dominant and Japanese general trading 
companies were important partners in many joint 
ventures. The standard organizational form for 
overseas operations was an international division. 
As for people and language, management by 
Japanese persons using the Japanese language has 
been practiced for a long period of time. 
　As time has passed, most of these features of 
Japanese multinationals are gone or are weakening. 
In the first place, the international strategy of 
Japanese multinationals has become more similar 
with that of Western counterparts. Following the 
changes in strategies, the international manage-
ment of Japanese multinationals has also been 
increasing similarity with American and European 
counterparts. Recently Japanese multinationals 
have begun changing with respect to people and 
language in international management. 
　In sum, Japanese multinationals have weakened 
their uniqueness and strengthened their common-
ality with US and European multinationals.
3　Limits of Japanese Management
　As I have already mentioned, managers of local 
nationals have difficulties in demonstrating their 
capabilities at overseas subsidiaries of Japanese 
multinationals. We may add two kinds of people 
who have similar difficulties at Japanese companies. 
They are female employees and MBA graduates.
　Female CEOs are almost zero in Japan. I know 
only two female CEOs of the listed Japanese 
companies. They are Ms Chiyono Terada at Art 
Corporation, a transportation company, and Ms 
Shoko Ikeda at Bull-Dog Sauce, a Worcester sauce 
company.
　The senior and middle management positions are 
mostly occupied by male managers. Female 
managers are only 2.2％ of the senior managers 
︵department heads）at companies which have one 
hundred or more employees.（Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 
13 February 2003）
　There are four obstacles to the promotion of 
female employees to managerial posts in Japanese 
companies. The first obstacle is over time work, the 
second is the habits of eating and drinking with 
colleagues after office hours, the third is eating and 
drinking with people of other companies and 
organizations, and the forth is transfer including 
assignments to distant locations. These four are 
taken granted by male employees. On the other 
hand, they are almost unsolvable problems to 
female employees, especially those who are married 
with children.（Taniguchi, 1996）
　MBA graduates from overseas and Japanese 
business schools also have difficulties in finding 
opportunities to display their educational attain-
ments at Japanese companies. MBA graduates have 
no advantages in salary and promotion compared 
with ordinary non-MBA employees. As a common 
corporate practice, MBA graduates and other 
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employees are treated equally.（Kim, 2007）
　There has been a kind of business school boom 
in these days in Japan. There may be around fifty 
business schools. Nearly two thousand students 
graduate business schools every year. They have 
difficulties in finding good jobs and in getting 
promotion. Generally speaking, Japanese companies 
are skeptical about MBA graduates. 
　One feature of Japanese style of management is 
MWA. MWA means management by walking 
around.3 Managers appear themselves once or 
twice a day on the shop floor and take a direct look 
at the operations of workers. They watch work 
processes, chat with workers about their conditions 
including such private matters as health conditions 
of their wives and school lives of their children, and 
check orderliness of work place. When something 
wrong happens on the shop floor, they rush to the 
spot to fix the problem with workers. At the facto-
ries of Japanese companies hands-on knowledge is 
more emphasized than textbook knowledge. Quick 
action is more important than time consuming 
discussion and analysis. Teamwork is more 
emphasized than individual action. It may not be 
easy for MBA graduates to work effectively in the 
MWA style of management at Japanese companies. 
　Widely told and written features of Japanese 
management are applied to Japanese regular male 
employees. Japanese management shows different 
features to female employees and MBA graduates 
at Japanese parent companies. Japanese man-
agement also shows different features to the 
managers of local nationals at overseas subsidiar-
ies. Japanese management is not good at utilizing 
female employees, MBA gradates, and managers of 
local nationals. This may be limits of Japanese 
management. The changes in international 
management of Japanese multinationals which I 
treated in the present paper may probably be a first 
step toward breaking the limits of Japanese 
management. The changes in international man-
agement may be belated, yet these changes are 
worth paying close attention.
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Notes　　　　　　　
　The paper was originally prepared for the keynote speech 
at the ANZIBA（Australia and New Zealand International 
Business Academy）Conference, held at Victoria University 
of Wellington, New Zealand, 18 November 2006. The main 
part of the paper was presented under the title of “Develop-
ment of Strategy and Management of Japanese Multination-
als” at the Case Study Forum on Business Administration in 
China held at Renmin University of China in Beijing, China 
on 8 December 2007.
1　This definition is similar to the definition employed by 
the Multinational Enterprise Research Group of the 
Harvard Business School（Vernon, 1972︶.
2　The ʻglobalʼ English of this company may be seen as an 
example of controlled English.（Feely and Harzing, 
2003）
3　I owe the word of MWA to T. J. Peters and N. K. Austin 
︵1985︶. They use the word of MWBA（Management by 
Walking Around︶.
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